B. Rejection of the Opinion

1. About the First Conclusion

a. The Falsity of it in Itself is Shown

349. As concerns this opinion, there is only need to care much about the first conclusion [n.328] because of the second conclusion [n.329]. For the whole force of this question is: Since in certain changes that appear here (as change of place and the like), we can manifestly find some subject that remains the same under the terms of the change, and this by at least positing here, according to the common opinion [n.150], quantity alone without a subject, but since in a change whose terms are quantity it is not easy in this way to find a subject, then there cannot be here a change from quantity to quantity.

350. This difficulty is common, whether the whole succeeding quantity is new or a part of it is, because if a new part of change, however small, is granted, I will look for a subject of it. There is no need, then (as far as concerns the proposed view about a subject of change as to the quantity of what here appears), to reject the opinion that posits a whole new quantity more than to reject any other opinion that posits at least some new part of quantity - which everyone has to do, otherwise there would not then be more quantity than before.

351. However, Godfrey’s first conclusion [n.328] seems false.

352. The reason is that, if the subject does not remain the same, no accident of it remains the same; but for you the quantity of wine does not remain the same when it is rarefied [nn.328, 336]; therefore, no accident remains there the same because, according to the common opinion [n.150], any accident whatever is there in the quantity, whether mediately or immediately, and consequently the savor does not remain the same in number nor the color the same in number, and so forth.

353. And if it be said that it is an argument of the uneducated to take flight to the senses, because reason should judge about same and different if any objection is raised, since according to the Philosopher, Physics 8.3.254a30-33, it is fatuous to seek a reason there where we have something more certain than reason; it also seems strange if the senses cannot judge of the number of their proper sensibles, since number (according to the Philosopher On the Soul 2.6.418a17-20) is per se perceptible - these problems I give no weight to, because, as I have said elsewhere [Ord. II d.3 n.21], none of the senses judges whether the rays of the sun are continuously the same or different in a medium, although however that of which there is number or unity here is a proper sensible.

354. Passing this over, then, I argue as follows: it is not possible that agents, however much diverse, should induce the same form after corruption of the same thing; but whatever these sorts of species are rarefied by, whether by fire or the sun, such and such a savor and such and such a color are induced.

355. If you posit the accidents to be new [n.328], the argument goes more plainly as follows: The species of wine can be rarefied by fire; but all the qualities that appear there cannot be induced by fire, both because fire does not virtually contain in itself the qualities of mixtures, and because, if it does contain them, yet not accidents as greatly diverse in genus or species. But if the consecrated wine were here sweet and there bitter, the bitterness remains after rarefaction in these species and the sweetness in those, and so on as to any species at all of savor and any at all of colors (if, suppose, white wine is consecrated, or golden, or red). Therefore rarefying wine alone does not induce all these qualities; therefore they are not new. Therefore neither is the subject new, namely the quantity, without which they cannot remain the same.

b. Again, from the Statements of Him who Holds the Opinion

356. Argument secondly against this opinion from the statements of him who holds it. For he says that substance is individual formally through quantity; therefore, this bread is formally this bread through this quantity; therefore, when this quantity is corrupted, this bread no longer remains here, but a different singular bread does. Therefore, in any case of rarefaction the whole prior substance is corrupted and a new one generated.

357. This seems sufficiently improbable and against reason, because that such an alteration necessarily at once requires a new substance is to say that there cannot be variation as to the posterior if there is not variation as to the prior; and not a posterior in some way or other, but what is neither a proper passion nor consequent necessarily to the prior - which seems manifestly unacceptable.

c. About the Two Reasons Adduced for the First Conclusion

α. About the First Reason

358. The reasons for this conclusion do not prove it.

The first, about the incompossibility of the terms of motion or change [n.332], is solved by the fact that the major proposition is true of first terms, which are always privation and form; but the said proposition is not universally true of terms concomitant with the primary terms, as was said above in the opinion about forms, in distinction 10 question 2 the last article [d.10 nn.121-123].

359. And if you argue that here more and less are incompossible, I reply they are so as ultimately and completely informing the subject, but not as ‘less’ is something of ‘more’; otherwise it would be necessary to say, on the basis of this argument, that the whole quantity of the increased thing would be new, which is not probable but rather the parts of flesh in their species, which parts remain the same, are quanta with the same quantity as before; however, some quantity is new of the parts of substance that have come to it.

360. And when Godfrey himself afterwards deduces [n.333] that quantity is not moved from the greater to the lesser, I go along with him (and about quality likewise), because quantity and the greater and lesser in quantity (not speaking of the respect that ‘greater’ involves, but of the absolute that the respect presupposes as proximate foundation) are not essentially distinct, not even in the way the subject of motion must be distinct from the term of motion.

361. And therefore I simply concede the argument that some form of some genus does not change to greater and lesser within the genus; but the whole form, which is greater either in quantity or quality, does so - where I do not say that a per accidens being is the term ‘from which’ and that the whole form (which is lesser) is the term ‘to which’, or conversely; and yet the thing that is lesser could exist in the whole form, which is greater, as some element of it.

β. About the Second Reason

362. As to the second reason [n.335], look for the answer.a Unless perhaps the first proposition, “any part of the rarer is rarer,” is false save when speaking of parts according to species and not according to matter, in the way the proposition from On Generation 1.5.321a2-3 is true, that “any part of what is increased is increased.” And then one should say that rarefaction is not towards any uniform quality in the whole altered thing or any part of it. But in this way: the rarefying agent generates from some parts of the rarefi-able body some bodies finer than is the rarefi-able body; and because those bodies cannot be simultaneous with the other parts that still remain in their species (for ‘two bodies cannot be together’), therefore the parts expel the other parts from their place, and consequently the whole body occupies a greater place. And thus ‘to be rarer’ is nothing other than to have a greater number of finer bodies mixed, by juxtaposition, with the thing’s own parts- such that, in brief, ‘the rarer’ is what thus has finer corpuscles together with its own parts still remaining in their proper form. Nor is it surprising that some parts are able to be converted into a finer body before others are, because some parts are closer to the agent, and more quickly receive its action than others do.

a.a [Interpolation] A first response to the reason could be denial of the supposition tat, namely, rarity is the reason for the greater quantity, or the new superadded quantity; for rarity is a stretching out of extension, which extension is a mode of quality. Or in another way, by holding that rarity implies greater quantity, I concede the point when it is said that ‘any part of the rarer is rarer’ [n.336]; I distinguish ‘therefore any part is greater’; I deny ‘or according to the same quantity’; I thus concede ‘or according to different quantities’. When he says ‘therefore any part is a quantum with a double quantity, namely a new and a pre-existing quantity’ - this is denied. And when the proof is given ‘because, when the greater arrives, the lesser does not give way, therefore it gets greater and is the first part; therefore, they are two’ [n.337], I say the thing presupposed is false, because quantity is homogeneous, therefore it becomes one (as that, when two waters joined together, there are not two waters but one). However, the first response is truer [sc. first lines in this interpolation], as is plain at the end of the question in response to the third argument [n.420]

363. On the contrary: some parts are corrupted at once at the beginning of alteration, and so new substances will be generated; and likewise, everywhere is the body altered uniformly - the senses say this.

364. To the first [n.363] I say that the body is not more rare at once, because greater rarity is only established from occupation of greater place; but there is no greater occupation before there is heating in some noticeably greater degree.

365. To the second [n.363] I say that neither do the senses discriminate spirits or vapors in the air from the air, and yet spirits or vapors in the air are not of the same species as the air.

366. As to the second conclusion of this opinion [n.329], where the fundamental weight of this question lies (because, as was said before [nn.349-350], there is a difficulty in it against both opinions - namely both against the opinion that posits a new total quantity and against the opinion that posits its newness in part) - I argue against the aforesaid second conclusion, which allows motion from an agent and without a moveable subject, by bringing back the reasons that Godfrey himself brings forward against himself and which he tries to solve [nn.341-348].

a. About the First Contrary Reason and its Solution

367. First as to the first reason, about creation [n.341], as follows: what is as to the whole of itself and wholly brought into being from non-being is either created or at least requires a producing virtue equal to creative virtue; but this new quantity is, for you [n.341], brought as a whole and wholly into being; therefore.

368. Proof of the major:

First, because if it is totally produced after nothing, it is plainly a creation; but if it is produced after something and yet totally, this can only be by total conversion of that thing into this; or if you imagine another way, at least this transition requires an active virtue as equal as total conversion into this thing requires; but such a total conversion can only come from a virtue equal to divine creative virtue.

369. Second (and it is a confirmation of the preceding): when a succeeds to b, a is not, on account of its succeeding to b, of a different idea from b as concerns anything intrinsic to itself (this point is proved, first, because when a is in the process of succeeding, it is not then what it succeeds to; therefore what succeeds does not, on this account, vary in itself; second, because the order of what is posterior to this or that does not seem to vary the foundation of the order in itself). But if a succeeded to nothing and had its total being after non-being, it would be created; nor could it in any way be thus produced as a whole and wholly save by infinite virtue. Therefore, though it now succeed to any other thing whatever, yet, if it be produced as a whole and wholly, it would as a result, since the term is in itself altogether the same, require equal virtue for what is produced.

370. If you say that, because it succeeds to this thing, there is not as much productive virtue required as would be required if it succeeded only to nothing or to negation - this does not seem probable, because the term ‘to which’ does not require a different productive virtue save because of a different perfection in the term to be produced; therefore if the whole is wholly produced after something or after a nonsomething, an equal virtue is required.

371. Again, there is confirmation of this, because what has some term as a whole and wholly in its active power can put that term into being when it is not impeded; but it is not impeded by the fact that it does not have something positive that will be wholly changed from being to non-being, for it is fatuous to say that what is to be corrupted is an impediment to the agent; therefore, although it not have any such thing to be destroyed, it can put the whole effect wholly into being, and do so after nothing - and consequently it can create.

372. This reasoning [n.371] is confirmed, because if this quantity were to succeed to its contrary or its opposite, the objector would concede that it was created; but thus is the negation of it included in the pre-existing quantity, for any incompossible thing simply includes the negation of its incompossible and not in any way the affirmation of it - unless (by reason of a common subject) this preceding quantity no more has a subject in common with the succeeding quantity than the contrary has with the contrary; therefore this quantity just as much follows the negation of its being as it would if its opposite had preceded.

373. Against two things touched on in the response to the first reason:

The first is about the force remaining in the separated accident [n.367]. I argue as follows: nothing positive remains in a separated accident that was not in the accident as united [with a subject]; but there was no force in the accident as conjoined just because some term could be produced from it, but only because it was able to be the term of change and because another term was able to be drawn out from the potency of the subject; therefore in it as separated there was no force by which it could, with respect to alteration, have anything other than the idea of term. The first proposition, namely that ‘nothing positive is new in the separated accident’ was proved above in this distinction [nn.17-20].

374. Another thing he [Godfrey] adds at the end of his response, that if this quantity did not have a relation to the preceding quantity, then it would properly be created [n.372]. I add a minor: but this relation to the prior pre-existing quantity does not prevent the creation of it; therefore it is created. Proof of the minor: this relation is only a certain immediate succession of the being of this thing to the being of that; but such succession does not prevent the succeeding thing from being created. And this can be proved by an example, because the succession here is not more immediate than the being of the soul is to the organization of the body, and yet it is not denied that the soul is created in the organized body; therefore not here either. Now the reason in the former case is that the soul receives its whole being and receives it wholly after its not-being. And the same reason holds in the issue at hand, because this quantity receives its whole being and receives it wholly after its non-being.

375. But whether, along with the non-being, something positive preceded or nothing did, or whether even the contrary or the like preceded, it makes no difference to b, because the first terms there are the same as the terms of creation.

b. About the Second Contrary Reason and its Solution

376. Now I bring back the second reason, where he concedes the body of Christ remains as long as the accidents remain that are of a nature to affect the substance of the bread, though it would remain not precisely as long as these accidents remain the same in number [nn.342, 347]. To the contrary of this: because the quantity that succeeds to the pre-existing quantity is no more the same as the pre-existing quantity than is any other quantity in one other non-consecrated host; indeed it is less the same, because this succeeding quantity is incompossible with the pre-existing quantity in being, but that quantity [sc. the quantity in another non-consecrated host] is not so; therefore the body of Christ will not be more under the new quantity becauseThe text says ‘which was before’, but a variant says ‘because it was before’, and the variant looks to make more sense. ⁵² it was before under the other [pre-existing quantity] than it will be under any other quantity whatever, namely any quantity that is equally the same as the pre-existing quantity.

377. And if you take refuge in the succession of this quantity to that, I argue as follows: the body of Christ is under no quantity save by conversion and consecration;Sc. according to Godfrey’s opinion, not necessarily Scotus’. ⁵³ but by conversion and consecration it receives no being save under that quantity, and this [new] quantity is altogether different, just as is the quantity of another non-consecrated host; therefore, by this conversion and consecration it will not be under that [sc. new] quantity;     therefore it will not be under it in any way.

378. An argument could also be made through what was adduced against the first conclusion of the aforesaid opinion, through the statements of him who holds the opinion [n.356], that Christ’s body does not remain here under the species of bread longer than the bread that was converted would be of a nature to remain here; but the bread that was converted would not remain here under another quantity if bread is here through quantity; therefore etc     .

c. About the Third Contrary Reason and its Solution

379. As to the third response [n.348], which agrees with the third reason he adduces for himself as far as this conclusion is concerned, namely [n.343] that it is not of the essence of motion that some subject be differently disposed according to it - I do not argue against it because I believe the conclusion in itself to be true. But as to the issue at hand (because he concedes that, because of it, motion itself without a subject can be from a created agent [n.346]) I argue as follows: a created agent cannot make an accident in settled being without a subject; therefore, by similarity or a fortiori, it cannot cause an accident in flux without a subject.

d. About the Three Reasons Adduced for the Second Conclusion

380. On the above basis I respond to the reasons that he adduces for the second conclusion:

That the first reason [n.338] does well prove that God can make a form in flux or in coming to be, just as he can make it in settled being, without a subject; but it does not follow that a created agent can thus make a form in flux without a subject; rather the opposite follows, that it cannot make a form at rest without a subject, but as causing motion it causes in effect a form in flux.

381. The second reason [n.339], namely that God so endows a separated accident that everything can belong to it that could belong to it in a subject, proves the opposite, for nothing could belong to it in a subject save only that it was the term of motion; therefore, in no way could something else belong to it outside a subject. And so some other subject of motion must be granted, because, according to him [n.333], the subject of motion is different from the term of motion.

382. His third reason [n.340], namely that it is not of the essence of motion that the subject is in flux because of it, does well prove that God can make motion without a subject, but does not prove it of a created agent. For a created agent cannot separate anything at all from what is of the essence of it. Indeed, according to the response to the first reason [n.379] the opposite follows, because a created agent can no more separate a form from a subject in flux than from a subject in settled being; but a created agent cannot be the active cause of a form in settled being without a subject, therefore not of a form in flux either.

e. About the Statement Added in Exposition of the Second Conclusion

383. Against what he himself adds in exposition of the second conclusion [n.330], namely that motion which is here per se according to quality is not without a subject, although what accompanies (namely quantity) the per se term of this motion is without a subject - against this as follows: Rarity is the first formal term of the formal motion of rarefaction; but the subject of it is the whole quantum; therefore the whole quantum is naturally presupposed to the term. Therefore, so much quantum cannot per accidens be acquired by the fact that so much quality is acquired, because what is naturally prior and presupposed to something else is not acquired merely by the fact that what is naturally posterior is acquired; rather the prior is presupposed having already been acquired.